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Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot of Hung
Jury Instructions
George C. Thomas III and Mark Greenbaum
Abstract
Constitutional law grows more complex over time. The complexity is due, in
large part, to the rule of stare decisis. When faced with precedents that it does
not wish to follow, the Court usually distinguishes the case before it. Thus, the
constitutional landscape is littered with cases that do not fit well together. Navi-
gating past these shoals is often difficult for courts following the Supreme Court’s
lead. One example is the law governing instructions that a trial judge can give a
deadlocked jury in a criminal case. The right to a jury trial entails the right to have
the jury reach a verdict without pressure from the judge, but giving voice to that
principle has resulted in a bewildering array of approved instructions. This article
argues that the law of 1824, manifested in Justice Story’s opinion in United States
v. Perez, was superior to today’s morass. In 1824, judges had virtually uncon-
trolled discretion to decide when to declare a hung jury. We argue for a return to
1824 with one twist: that judges give deadlocked juries the instruction: “Please
continue to deliberate.” This simple change will result in fewer hung juries and
far fewer appeals about whether the instructions were too coercive.
1Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot of Hung Jury Instructions 
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INTRODUCTION 
One persistent form of hubris is to think that law in 2006 has evolved to be 
more advanced, and thus better, than law in the past.  The Bill of Rights is a 
brilliant document, so the argument goes, but two hundred years of case law 
have developed a more sophisticated, thoughtful, and better understanding of 
the rights created by the Framers.  The ultimate purpose of this article is to 
demonstrate the falsity of the notion that law today is always better than law in 
the past.  We will make the argument in the context of jury verdicts, with an 
emphasis on the law of hung juries.  Judges in Justice Joseph Story’s day 
viewed hung juries in criminal cases as a highly disfavored outcome.  Today, 
judges routinely accept hung juries in criminal cases as the “cost of doing 
business,” in large part because of a fear that instructions designed to 
encourage verdicts might be unduly coercive.   
This article will trace the legal development of this issue from Justice 
Story’s day to the present.  In the process, we will highlight a little-noticed 
problem with the case-by-case method of creating constitutional law.  Law 
constructed this way has a tendency to become more complex and less coherent 
as later cases try to fit within prior precedents without overruling ones that do 
not fit very well.  Over time, this process can produce what we will call the 
“common law Gordian knot”: a doctrine so complex and inconsistent that it 
provides little guidance to judges and often blinds them to the perversity of the 
way the doctrine works.1 Our example will be the law governing the 
instructions that judges are permitted to give juries when panels announce a 
failure to reach a verdict.  In our view, judges of Justice Story’s generation 
followed a far more salutary, and simpler, approach to hung juries.   
We argue that the Story era manifested more wisdom on this issue than the 
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2modern doctrine.  While we do not advocate imprisoning juries in unheated 
rooms without food or drink – as was routinely done during Blackstone’s era2 –
we do advocate a paradigm shift in the attitude of judges.  The right response to 
a deadlocked panel should not be “mistrial” but rather, a simple instruction, 
“please continue to deliberate.”  We advocate, in sum, a return to the days of 
yesteryear when a mistrial was a rare and disfavored outcome and juries were 
expected to return a verdict.     
Part I briefly explains why it was critical in the early days of juries for the 
jury to return a unanimous verdict.  It begins with the thirteenth century view 
that juries deliver perfect justice, and brings most of the story as far as 
Blackstone.  Part II pauses to inquire into the problem of judicial coercion, 
beginning with the William Penn case from the seventeenth century, and then 
explores how modern courts have emphasized fear of judicial coercion in 
deciding what instructions may be given to juries to encourage a verdict.  The 
modern doctrine is a textbook example of how the case-by-case method of 
constructing law can produce a maddeningly complex and unsatisfactory legal 
doctrine.  This part also briefly considers the frequency of hung juries to better 
conceptualize the problem.  Part III proposes a novel way to cut the Gordian 
knot of current law on instructing hung juries, a solution that returns us to the 
elegance of Justice Story’s opinion for the Supreme Court in 1824.   
I. JURIES REPLACE GOD 
After the fall of Rome, criminal juries disappeared for over five hundred 
years.3 This left various forms of “the ordeal” as the only mechanism for 
determining guilt in the Western world.  Apparently developed by the 
Germanic tribes of central Europe, the ordeal functioned to obtain God’s view.  
One example Blackstone gives is of the fire ordeal 
Fire-ordeal was performed either by taking up in the hand, unhurt, a piece of red-
hot iron, of one, two, or three points weight; or else by walking, barefoot, and 
blindfold, over nine red-hot plowshares, laid lengthwise at unequal distances: and if 
the party escaped being hurt, he adjudged innocent; but if it happened otherwise, as 
without collusion it usually did, he was condemned as guilty.4
We need not describe other forms of the ordeal for they shared the same 
premise important to our point about juries: the ordeal was viewed as infallible 
because it relied on the judgment of God.  As long as one were willing to 
 
2. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375 (William S. 
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3believe that God would intervene and that the priests who “judged” the order 
could perfectly ascertain God’s judgment, the ordeal never produced an 
incorrect or an ambiguous outcome. 
Little wonder, then, that when English juries began to supplant the ordeal in 
the thirteenth century, a requirement of unanimity quickly took hold.  For the 
jury was replacing a mechanism that, in theory, was perfect.  As Pollack and 
Maitland put it: “Nor must it escape us that the justices are pursuing a course 
which puts the verdict of the country on a level with the older modes of proof.  
If a man came clean from the ordeal . . . , the due proof would have been given; 
no one could have questioned the dictum of Omniscience.”5 A jury verdict of 
7-to-5 would hardly have seemed beyond question.   
Moreover, the English jury was viewed as speaking for the community, and 
the English community of the thirteenth century had but one voice.  Indeed, 
had the jury arisen later, a majority vote might have been sufficient to convict.  
In France, where Voltaire was instrumental in the institution of juries, a vote of 
8-to-4 in a modern trial produces a conviction.6 But in thirteenth century 
England, “as yet men had not accepted the dogma that the voice of a majority 
binds the community.”7 Whether it was the king, the grand jury, or the 
criminal jury, each institution had only one voice.  Again in the words of 
Pollock and Maitland, “[T]he voice of the twelve men is deemed to be the 
voice of the country-side, often the voice of some . . . district which is more 
than a district, which is a community.”8 In sum, “the parties to the litigation 
have ‘put themselves’ upon a certain test.  That test is the voice of the country.  
Just as a corporation can have but one will, so a country can have but one 
voice.”9
For a time, defendants tended to resist juries, preferring the remnants of the 
ordeal system that survived the Lateran Council’s prohibition of clerics 
participating in the ordeal.  Parliament and the judges, however, preferred 
juries and they reacted by seeking to coerce defendants to choose juries.  By 
1275, a statute ordered “strong and hard imprisonment” of those who refused to 
answer an indictment by putting themselves on the country.10 A later and more 
gruesome example is peine forte et dure where the “defendant was placed on 
the ground and stones were piled on his chest until he either expired or groaned 
‘country, country,’ indicating his acceptance of the jury of verdict.”11 
By the mid-fourteenth century, juries had become the normal and accepted 
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4way to determine guilt, “and defendants were not longer asked to put 
themselves on the country.”12 The law about the role of jurors was, for a time 
settled.  Criminal defendants were tried by juries, composed of twelve men, 
who were required to render a verdict unanimously.   
Very little changed over the next four hundred years.  In 1791, Americans 
had so much faith in the wisdom of local criminal juries that the initial failure 
to require local juries threatened to doom the Constitution before its ultimate 
passage.  Article III required juries in federal criminal cases, to be sure, but the 
trial could be held, and thus the jury empanelled, in any court in the state.  
Patrick Henry stated the pervasive feelings at the time  
Why do we love this trial by jury?  Because it prevents the hand of oppression from 
cutting you off.  They may call any thing rebellion, and deprive you of a fair trial by 
an impartial jury of your neighbors.  Has not your mother country magnanimously 
preserved this noble privilege upwards of a thousand years? . . . That country had 
juries of hundredoers [local citizens] for many generations.  And shall America give 
up that which nothing could induce the English people to relinquish?  The idea is 
abhorrent to my mind.  There was a time when we should have spurned it.  This 
gives me comfort - -that as long as I have existence, my neighbors shall protect me.  
Old as I am, it is probable that I may yet have the appellation of rebel.  I trust that I 
shall see congressional oppression crushed in embryo.  As this government stands, I 
despise and abhor it . . . [I]t takes away the trial by jury in civil cases, and does 
worse than take it away in criminal cases.  It is gone unless you preserve it now.13 
The Anti-Federalists believed juries could reach more just outcomes than 
judges.  To reach those outcomes of course, juries must return a verdict.  And 
the evidence from the colonies is that juries always did return a verdict.  We  
know, for example, that no mistrials appeared in New Jersey criminal cases 
from 1749-57.14 This is not surprising, of course, because mistrials were not a 
recognized outcome in Blackstone’s Commentaries.   
If an eighteenth century English jury did not reach a unanimous verdict 
before the judge had to leave for the next town on his circuit, he could “carry 
them round the circuit from town to town in a cart.”15 We suspect not many 
juries would fail to reach a unanimous verdict if the alternative was to be kept 
together and transported by cart from town to town.  Occasionally, as we will 
see, a brave jury would refuse to reach a verdict, but these were outliers in the 
common law system.   
The first report of a mistrial for failure to reach a verdict in an American 
court was 1807.16 As late as 1824, Justice Story could declare, for a unanimous 
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5Court in United States v. Perez, that the power to declare a mistrial when the 
jury could not reach a verdict “ought to be used with the greatest caution, under 
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital 
cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with 
any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.”17
The next hundred years would see a gradual evolution in the conception of 
the jury’s role.  By the time we get to the middle of the twentieth century, 
Justice Story’s concern in Perez that mistrials would interfere with the 
possibility of a favorable outcome for the defendant – an acquittal – had been 
turned on its head.  A mistrial based on a hung jury had become a favorable 
outcome, one that potentially protected innocent defendants from being 
convicted.  The theory was that, faced with a hung jury, prosecutors would 
often concede defeat and not re-prosecute.  Hung jury mistrials were no longer 
outliers and judges were discouraged from exhorting juries to continue 
deliberating.   
The story of that evolution is largely a story of judges developing exquisite 
concern about coercing juries to reach a verdict.  Judges in Blackstone’s day 
were willing to cart jurors from town to town until they reached a verdict.  
Modern judges flinch from the prospect of asking jurors merely to continue 
deliberation.   
II. THE FEAR OF JUDICIAL COERCION 
The “hung jury” is a fairly straightforward concept.  It is defined as “[a] 
jury that cannot reach a verdict by the required voting margin.”18 At common 
law, and in almost all states today, criminal juries must reach their verdicts by a 
unanimous verdict.  Thus, a single stubborn or misinformed juror can “hang” a 
criminal jury.  The ultimate question, for the criminal justice system as well as 
this article, is the extent to which judges can go to encourage a hung jury to 
continue deliberating.  One approach is that of the common law of 
Blackstone’s day: simply keep the jury together until it reaches a verdict.  A 
variation on that theme can be found in the famous Bushel’s Case.
A. Seventeenth Century Judicial Coercion 
Bushel’s Case stemmed from another proceeding, the trial of the eventual 
founder of Pennsylvania, William Penn, who was charged with sedition and 
attempting to plant the seeds of rebellion against the English Crown by 
committing unlawful assembly and disturbance of the peace.19 Penn and his 
 
obsolete” and that a jury could be discharged only “when necessary to justice.”).   
17. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). 
18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 860 (7th ed. 1999). 
19. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 68-
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6associate William Mead had addressed a small group of fellow Quakers in 
London.20 In 1670, English persecution of Quakers was near its apex, and 
Penn’s peaceful speech was merely a pretext for the Crown to pursue a high-
profile Quaker.21 
At Penn’s trial, three witnesses testified that they had seen Penn preaching 
in the street, in violation of the law, but none of them had been able to hear 
what he had said.22 Much of the other evidence presented was equally non-
compelling.  Nevertheless, the case was submitted to the jury, and the court did 
not mince words in expressing what verdict it expected.  In summing up the 
case, the judge told the jury 
You have heard what the Indictment is, It is for preaching to the people . . . . there 
are three or four witnesses that have proved this, that he did preach there. . . . now 
we are upon the matter of fact, which you are to keep to, and observe, as what hath 
been fully sworn at your peril.23 
The jury then retired and deliberated for ninety minutes before returning to 
court and declaring that it was deadlocked eight-to-four in favor of conviction 
on the most serious charge of unlawful assembly.24 One alderman in the 
audience screamed at a juror he knew, Edward Bushel, ranting that Bushel 
“deserve[d] to be indicted more than any man that hath been brought to the bar 
this day,” and the judge threatened Bushel that he would be branded unless the 
jury promptly found Penn and Mead guilty of unlawful assembly.25 The judge 
sent the jury back to deliberate, and the panel returned, finding Penn and Mead 
guilty of the lesser charge of preaching, but not guilty of unlawful assembly.26 
It repeated these findings thirty minutes later after being forced to reconsider.  
 Nearly berserk with anger at this announcement, the court Recorder ordered 
that the jury be locked in the jury room without “eat, drink, fire, and tobacco,” 
or a chamber pot, until they reached a proper verdict on the unlawful assembly 
charge.27 The next day, the jury refused to relent, and this time, the judge 
threatened to cut Bushel’s throat.28 Finally, on the day after that, the judge 
accepted the jury’s not guilty verdict as to the unlawful assembly charge, but 
fined each juror forty marks.29 Led by Bushel, eight of the jurors refused to 
pay the fine.  The court promptly sent them to Newgate Prison, ironically 
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7where both Penn and Mead had been sent.30 Bushel and his peers appealed 
their fines to the Court of Common Pleas, which, nearly a year after Penn’s 
trial had ended, invalidated the fines.31 Speaking through Chief Justice John 
Vaughan, the court found that a trial court could never punish a juror for his 
verdict.32
While Bushel’s Case teaches about the need for limits on judicial coercion, 
it imparts no lesson about the proper limits on a judge’s ability to insist that the 
jury continue deliberating.  We turn now to that issue. 
B. The Common Law Gordian Knot 
 The grandeur of the common law is that it is an evolving judicial creation, 
almost a living thing.  No case falls outside the purview of the common law.  
Common law judges can rely on moral philosophy, on prior cases, on logic, 
and on common sense to decide any issue that comes before them.  Past cases 
demonstrate this flexibility.  In 1682, the House of Lords established a rule 
permitting land to be made inalienable for the lifetime of someone who 
inherited the property – the beginning of the Rule Against Perpetuities.33 The 
court was so lacking authority for its holding that when asked “where will you 
stop” in permitting land to be kept inalienable, Lord Nottingham responded: “I 
will tell you where I will stop: I will stop where-ever any visible Inconvenience 
doth appear.”34 The House of Lords ruled in 1884 that the imminent death of 
four shipwrecked sailors would not justify killing the weakest sailor so the 
others could feed on his body and live.35 Because there was no precedent, 
Chief Justice Coleridge relied on Lord Hale, Bracton, and other legal 
authorities in finding that necessity to save one’s life could never be a defense 
to murder.36 
In the famous American case of Pierson v. Post, 37 an early New York court 
had to decide whether pursuing a fox reduced it to the possession of the 
pursuer.  There were no American precedents and all the English precedents 
relied on English statutes.  With legal precedents thus unavailable, the common 
law court could turn to sources as exotic and diverse as Justinian, Puffendorf, 
Fleta, Bynkershock, Grotius, and treatise writers of the seventeenth and 
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8eighteenth centuries to decide that pursuit is not possession.38 
But the very flexibility of the common law approach can be its own worst 
enemy.  Judges seek to decide new cases consistently with the precedents, 
rather than overrule them, and this can create a doctrine of ever finer 
distinctions.  This tradition was necessary, of course, in an age when the law 
came only from judges.  If later judges decide the same issue differently from 
earlier judges, then one does not have “law” in any coherent sense. One has 
random chance. Ronald Dworkin has given a name to this tradition: law as 
“integrity.”39 Dworkin envisions judges deciding each new case consistently 
with “the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide 
the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”40 Those 
principles, of course, include all the relevant case law.  Law as integrity thus 
requires judges to attempt to fit the prior cases into the decision they reach and 
the opinion they write. 
 Dworkin’s arresting metaphor for this process is a chain novel. Each of the 
prior chapters in the novel has been written by a different judge.  Each 
successive judge “must try to make this the best novel it can be,” one that will 
be “construed as the work of a single author rather than, as is the fact, the 
product of many different hands.”41 This interpretive enterprise requires a 
series of judgments about how best to understand what has come before.  If 
possible, the judge must make her chapter fit the preceding chapters.  It is only 
when that proves impossible that she will abandon the effort.  Then the judge 
must begin a new novel.  At that juncture she must overrule precedent, but only 
after she has considered every interpretation that might make the novel – the 
law – coherent.42 
Dworkin’s theory has great explanatory power. It explains why law grows 
ever more complex.  Supreme Court justices have, on occasion, noted and 
criticized this trend.  Justice Clarence Thomas called the ever-growing 
complexity of constitutional law in the late twentieth century, “a regrettable 
development, for the law draws force from the clarity of its command and the 
certainty of its application.  As the complexity of legal doctrines increases, 
moreover, so too does the danger that their foundational principles will become 
obscured.”43 Somewhat more colorful is Justice Antonin Scalia’s description 
of a recent development in the Supreme Court’s confessions doctrine: “[T]he 
latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable 
fairyland castle of imagined constitutional restrictions upon law 
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39. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). 
40. Id. at 225.   
41. Id. at 229.   
42. Id. at 230.   
43. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
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9enforcement.”44 Castles, fairyland and otherwise, are in danger of collapsing if 
built too tall, as Justice Robert Jackson wisely observed in Douglas v. City of 
Jeannette: “This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of 
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story 
too many is added.”45
Constitutional law is not, of course, technically common law because it is 
based on a text.  But it is uncontroversial to assert that constitutional 
interpretation is based on the common law method.46 The Court is led to “new 
temples” in constitutional law because the text is usually sufficiently expansive 
that it answers only a small, and often trivial, subset of questions, thus inviting 
reliance on the “common law” of constitutional precedents.  The prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures answers zero questions, in the absence of 
some further definition of “reasonable,” and this is the reason Fourth 
Amendment law teeters on the verge of incoherence.  The Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments answers a small number of 
questions.  It would not permit convicted defendants to be drawn and quartered 
or their body parts cut off.  Beyond that, however, the Eighth Amendment tells 
us almost nothing.  And however punitive modern legislatures have become, it 
is doubtful that any legislature would mandate drawing and quartering as a 
punishment.  So that leaves the difficult real-life Eighth Amendment issues 
without a useful text. 
 When the common law Gordian knot becomes fully complete, law becomes 
so complex, inconsistent, and opaque that each case becomes its own self-
contained rule.  As law twists itself closer and closer into a fully complete 
Gordian knot, it begins to lose generalizable rules that have “bite,” though 
courts will surely trot out platitudinous verbiage and claim that it is following 
some rule or other.  No better example of this phenomenon exists than the 
Fourth Amendment.  One rule seems to exist, the one governing searches and 
seizures inside the home.  The rule is that a warrant is required.  But a 
moment’s reflection discloses so many exceptions to the rule that even it has 
little “bite.”  Evidence found and seized in a home is admissible without a valid 
search warrant if (1) the owner consented;47 (2) the police reasonably believe 
that the owner consents;48 (3) the police reasonably believe that the entry and 
search is justified by exigent circumstances;49 (4) the police made a good faith 
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45. 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., separate opinion).   
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effort to obtain a valid warrant;50 (5) the evidence would have been inevitably 
found if the police had not searched and seized when they did;51 (6) the person 
seeking to have the evidence suppressed was not the owner of the home or an 
overnight occupant;52 or (7) the search is not conducted by or on behalf of a 
state or federal actor.53 Similar exceptions exist for arrests made inside the 
home without a warrant.  Indeed, the police can search a person arrested in the 
home, without a warrant, if they simply take him outside his home before 
searching him.54 
So the “rule” about warrants being necessary for searches and seizures in a 
home is pretty porous.  But at least it can be articulated as a rule.  What can we 
say about searches outside the home?  For decades, the Supreme Court’s 
approach here was that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.55 This platitude has been ridiculed in dissents over the last decade.  
Justice Scalia has noted that there are “at least twenty exceptions to this rule.”56 
The Court, perhaps embarrassed by the criticisms from its own members as 
well as many commentators,57 has stopped claiming that a search warrant 
preference is the rule outside the home.  But then what is the rule?  Is it merely 
that a search or seizure must be reasonable?  That is Justice Scalia’s explicit 
position, one that would be a completed Gordian knot, but so far the Court has 
not embraced it.  Instead, the Court examines each case to see how it fits with 
precedent.  As each precedent gets hemmed in on all sides by later cases, it 
becomes narrower and narrower.  Soon, perhaps the Fourth Amendment 
outside the home will become a complete Gordian knot with courts asking only 
whether the search or seizure was reasonable.  In the meantime, it is close 
enough to prompt commentators to compare Fourth Amendment law to a tar-
baby,58 or an ocean liner that is rudderless and badly off course.59 The same 
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54. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).   
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
56. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).   
57. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 
(1985). 
58. Id. at 1468 (“The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court’s tar baby: a mass of contradictions 
and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Brethren’ in such a way that every effort to extract themselves 
only finds them more profoundly struck.”).   
59. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994) 
(“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner -- rudderless and badly off course -- yet most 
scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs.”).   
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could be said of modern hung jury instructions.   
 And what of the right to a jury trial, which is the constitutional text at issue 
in the hung jury cases?  The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury . . . .”60 This right, unlike the prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, is at one level about 
as determinate as words can be.  Defendants must be tried by a panel of people 
who are not judges.  But what does the right to trial by jury say about the 
content of instructions given to juries who cannot reach agreement?  The 
answer: nothing.  So courts have had to create a doctrine from nothing.  And 
the result is roughly on par with the Court’s doctrine of unreasonable search 
and seizure.  It is a Gordian knot that can be generously characterized as 
complex and inconsistent.  It can be less charitably described as incoherent. 
C. Modern Judicial Coercion in Charging Juries to Continue Deliberations 
The days of overt coercion in the mold of Bushel’s Case have long since 
passed.  In their place remains the so-called “dynamite charge” from the Allen 
v. United States61 line of cases, a charge that is given to hung juries as a 
supplemental instruction in hopes of untangling deadlock.  While the central 
aim of the charge has not changed substantially since it was first enunciated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1896, Allen is in need of replacement because it has 
twisted itself into a Gordian knot.  Reflecting on this dilemma, the American 
Bar Association wrote, with only a bit of hyperbole, “There is not merely one 
Allen charge, but an infinite number of variations of the charge, in current 
use.”62 These variations are heavily watered-down, long-winded versions of 
the original 1896 charge, often based on the ABA standards.  Thus, trial courts 
face a seemingly endless sea of confusing supplemental charges that often 
provide more fodder for appeals than guidance to deadlocked jury panels.63 
While some concerns about general supplemental instructions began to 
appear not long after Allen’s creation,64 many state and federal courts continued 
 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
61. The charge is derived from Allen v. United States (Allen III), 164 U.S. 492 (1896).  
62. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
TRIAL BY JURY (1968) cited in 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. &
PROC. CRIM. § 502, at 3 n. 24 (3d ed. 2000).  See also Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the 
Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123, 125 (1967) (“The progeny of 
Allen have displayed endless permutations.”). 
63. For a history of Allen’s development, see State v. Marsh, 490 P.2d 491, 494-97 (Or. 1971) and 
State v. Fields, 487 P.2d 831, 835-39 (Alaska 1971).   
64. Cf. Peterson v. United States, 213 F. 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1914) (court of appeals make no 
mention of Allen, but invalidates use of an unduly coercive deadlock charge).  See also Stewart v. 
United States, 300 F. 769, 782-88 (8th Cir. 1924); State v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 99 (Kan. 1936); Eikmeier v. 
Bennett, 57 P.2d 87 (Kan. 1936); Note, An Argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in 
California, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 939, 939 n.3 (1975).   
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to use it.65 However, the legal landscape changed when widespread complaints 
about Allen began to appear.66 For the most part, the complaints consisted of 
the same general objection: that Allen is inherently coercive.  Amid this 
groundswell, dozens of courts began to modify or ban the Allen charge.67 The 
ABA even joined the fray, formally recommending that “the Allen charge 
should not be used,”68 and then writing standards for modified supplemental 
instructions that many courts have since adopted in place of Allen.69
65. See People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1001 (Cal. 1977) (“Nevertheless, the Allen charge won 
relatively quick adoption in some 10 states . . . Undoubtedly the popularity of the instruction stemmed 
from its perceived efficiency as a means of ‘blasting’ a verdict out of a deadlocked jury in a manner 
which had the imprimatur of the highest court in the land.”) (citations omitted).  See also Huffman v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 754, 756-59 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied 370 U.S. 955 (1962).   
66. Many of the Articles exploring Allen came out in the early 1970s, mostly student-written.  
Most of them condemn Allen to one degree or another, and support the ABA standards.  See, e.g., Note, 
Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the “Allen Charge,” 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 
(1964); Note, Supplemental Charge to a Deadlocked Jury in a Criminal Case, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 292 
(1966); Note, supra note 62; Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968); Note, 
Defusing the Allen Charge: A Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REV. 749 (1969); Note, 
The Faltering Allen Charge and Its Proposed Replacement, 16 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 619 (1972); 
Comment, The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 326 (1972); 
Note, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 637 (1972); Comment, Supplemental Jury 
Charges urging a Verdict – the Answer is Yet to Be Found, 56 MINN. L. REV. 1199 (1972); Note, The 
Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1972); 
Comment, Instructing Deadlocked Juries: The Present State of the Allen Charge, 3 TEXAS. TECH. L. 
REV. 313 (1972); Comment, ABA Jury Instructions Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25 VAND L. 
REV. 246 (1972); Comment, The Allen Charge: The Propriety of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a 
Deadlocked Jury, 22 LOY. L. REV. 667 (1976); Paul Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: 
Is the Dynamite Charge About To Be Permanently Defused?, 43 MO. L. REV. 613 (1978); Matthew 
Barasch, Criminal Procedure: Antideadlock Jury Instructions in the District of Columbia, 35 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1179 (1986); Michael J. Crowley, Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk Are We 
Willing to Take?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1073 (1989); David M. Stanton, Note, United States v. Arpen: 
How Does the Dynamite Charge Affect Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REV. 461 (1990). 
67. See 2A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 502, at 3 nn.21-30. 
68. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 2d ed. (1979), at 15-43. 
69. Id. For a summary of many of the ABA’s prior recommendations as to the Allen charge, see 
Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME. L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1985). 
 The standards set out by the ABA are as follows: 
“5.4 Length of Deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may given an instruction which informs 
the jury:  
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; 
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; 
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial 
consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors; 
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to re-examine his own 
views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and  
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the 
evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of 
returning a verdict. 
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the 
jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in 
subsection (a).  The court shall not require or threaten the jury to deliberate for an 
unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.   
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is 
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We first describe the Allen Gordian knot in state and federal law before 
recommending a way to cut through the knot and begin anew.   
D. Origins and Development of the Dynamite Charge 
Allen v. United States represented the U.S. Supreme Court’s first 
substantive attempt to craft an instruction to be given to juries unable to reach a 
unanimous verdict.  In Allen, the defendant was charged with murder.  His first 
and second trials in the federal court for the Western District of Arkansas 
ended in conviction, but both convictions were reversed by the Supreme 
Court.70 A third murder trial was commenced against Allen in 1895.  At that 
proceeding, after the case was submitted to the jury, the panel reported to the 
court that it was deadlocked, and requested instructions.71 Eager to help the 
panel reach a verdict, the trial judge issued the following instruction to the jury, 
taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Tuey,72 an 1851 Massachusetts 
state court decision that examined a similar supplemental jury instruction: 
[I]n a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that 
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere 
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question 
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of 
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do 
so, that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s 
arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror 
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression 
upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself.  
If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask 
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment 
which was not concurred in by the majority.73 
The jury thereafter continued deliberations and promptly convicted Allen.   
 The Supreme Court affirmed Allen’s murder conviction, holding that the 
trial court’s instruction was not impermissible: 
While undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each 
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by 
conference in the jury room.  The very object of the jury system is to secure 
unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors 
themselves.  It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with 
deference to the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a 
large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does 
himself.  It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind 
determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment, 
 
nor reasonable probability of agreement.”   
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).   
70. Allen v. United States (Allen I), 150 U.S. 551 (1893); Allen v. United States (Allen II), 157 
U.S. 675 (1895).   
71. Allen III, 164 U.S. at 501.   
72. 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).   
73. Allen III, 164 U.S. at 501.    
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or that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally honest and 
intelligent as himself.  There was no error in these instructions.74 
In the 108 years since Allen was handed down, the Court has made very 
few other statements on the permissibility of supplemental jury instructions to 
deadlocked panels, and none as broad in scope as Allen. In a brief, one-page 
opinion, the Court held in Jenkins v. United States that a judge could not tell a 
deadlocked jury, “You have got to reach a decision in this case.”75 The Court 
reasoned that this instruction was overly coercive and could have forced the 
jury into reaching a unanimous verdict.76 Similarly, in Brasfield v. United 
States, the Court ruled that the trial judge could not ask a deadlocked jury of its 
numerical split, holding that such an inquiry would “be regarded as ground for 
reversal.”77 The Court concluded that if a judge ascertained the breakdown of a 
deadlocked jury, it would place undue coercion on those in the minority.78
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, the Court expressly upheld Allen, noting that 
“[t]he continuing validity of this Court’s observations in Allen are beyond 
dispute.”79 Lowenfield upheld the use of an Allen charge, in conjunction with 
two jury polls by the trial judge inquiring if further deliberations would be 
useful during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.80 The Court 
declined to apply Jenkins, finding that the language the trial judge had used in 
Jenkins was much stronger than that which the judge used in his supplemental 
instruction in Lowenfield.81 The Court also rejected the defendant’s reliance on 
Brasfield, noting that the jury polls were not of the panel’s vote on the ultimate 
issue – the defendant’s sentence – but merely of each juror’s belief of whether 
further deliberations would be useful in helping reach a unanimous verdict.82 
Thus, Allen charges are constitutional.  But long before Lowenfield, courts 
had begun to retreat from Allen for fear that even the relatively mild Allen 
charge was coercive.83 
74. Id. at 501-02.   
75. 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam).  For a transcript of the trial judge’s instruction, see Jenkins v. 
United States, 330 F.2d 220, 221 n.2 (C.A.D.C. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting).   
76. Id. at 446.    
77. 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926).  After the jury indicated it was deadlocked, the judge inquired as to 
the numerical breakdown of the split, and the jury reported it was nine-to-three.  Soon thereafter, the 
jury found the defendant guilty.  
78. Id. See also Note, supra note 62, at 131 n.43.  The issue of whether the trial court may inquire 
into the numerical breakdown of a deadlocked jury is itself an important issue.  For a breakdown of the 
relevant case law, see George R. Priest, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Trial Court’s 
Inquiry as to Numerical Division of Jury, 77 A.L.R.3d 769, §§ 3-5 (1977).   
79. 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988).  The Court has reinforced this view at other times.  See Jones v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 & n.5 (1999).   
80. Id.
81. Id. at 239 (“The difference between the language used there and the language used in the 
present case is sufficiently obvious to show the fallacy of petitioner’s request.”).    
82. Id. at 239-40.  
83. See United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A single Allen charge, 
without more, stands at the brink of impermissible coercion. . . . We conclude that as a sound rule of 
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E. The Modern Law of Dynamite Charges 
Probably because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance, many 
jurisdictions have adopted different sets of guidelines for deadlock charges.84 
While some of the procedures are quite similar to each other, all of them are 
filled with intricacies.  As a result, each trial court is left to give its own 
different charge and hope that it conforms to whatever variation the particular 
court of appeals decides to apply.  This is made quite apparent when one 
examines the landscape of the federal circuit courts.85
i. Allen in the Federal Circuits86 
By the 1960s, several judges on the U.S. courts of appeals were openly 
wondering whether Allen’s language might force jurors to abandon their beliefs 
to come to a unanimous verdict.87 Over time, federal appeals courts began to 
approve heavily modified dynamite charges that were filled with “balancing 
language.”88 The new charges addressed all members of a panel, and did not 
 
practice it is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge. . .”).   
84. The tremendous outgrowth of Allen modifications and alternative versions was apparent as 
early as the 1960s.  See Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1965) rev’d on other 
grounds, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (“The designation of ‘an Allen charge’ has tended to become an over-
simplification since, as might be expected, the express words before the Supreme Court in the Allen 
case have, in the intervening years, been frequently rearranged or altered, with resulting variations in 
emphasis or impact.”).  See also State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197 (Ariz. 1959); State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 
1054, 1057-58 (Mont. 1960).  In its early rejection of Allen, the Arizona Supreme Court made a 
prescient observation:  
It now appears that [Allen’s] continued use will result in an endless chain of designs, each link 
thereof tempered and forged with varying facts and circumstances welded with the 
everchanging personalities of the appellate court.  This is not in keeping with sound justice. . . 
. We are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits, and decree that its use shall no 
longer be tolerated and approved by this court.   
342 P.2d at 200.   
85. See generally 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & WILLIAM C. LEE, JURY PRAC. AND 
INST. CRIM. § 20.08 (5th ed. 2000).   
86. For a fuller discussion of the case law in each of the circuits, see Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, 
Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in Federal Criminal Case to Given Due Consideration to 
Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge) – Modern Cases, 44 A.L.R.Fed. 468, §§ 3-7 (1964).   
87. See Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562, 565 (10th Cir. 1947) (“The propriety of an 
instruction such as we have under consideration must be determined from whether it had a tendency to 
coerce the jurors in their deliberations so that the verdict which they ultimately reached and returned 
into court was not truly their own, but was brought about in part by coercion from the court.”); 
Huffman, 297 F.2d at 759 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“The fact is that in many phases of criminal law we 
have come a long way since 1896.  There is no longer any place for the Allen charge.”); Jenkins, 330 
F.2d at 222 (Wright, J., dissenting) (argued that the Allen charge was “condemned” and advocated for 
its abolition).  See also United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1965)  (court possessed 
“grave doubts whether the charge as given was not unduly coercive.”); Thaggard v. United States, 354 
F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (“I cannot see that the qualifications, 
reservations, and escape clauses customarily used in modern versions of the [Allen] charge save it from 
being what it is, and what the jury believes it to be, a direct appeal from the Bench for a verdict.”); 
Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854-57 (5th Cir. 1968).   
88. See Note, supra note 62, at 129; Thaggard, 354 F.2d at 739.  But see Fulwood v. United States, 
369 F.2d 960, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that an unbalanced instruction to deadlocked jury was not 
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implore jurors in the minority to reconsider their views.  By doing so, many 
courts believed, the trial judge would not give jurors in the minority the 
impression that the court was singling only them out.  Failure to include 
balancing language to this effect in a charge was gradually found to constitute 
per se coercion by many courts.89 Today, many of the different supplemental 
charges used by the federal circuits reflect these feelings about Allen.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit uses a cautious 
approach in dealing with deadlocked juries.  In United States v. Nichols the 
First Circuit articulated a three-prong test for determining whether a district 
court’s dynamite charge was proper.90 The court has held that the “district 
court should instruct jurors in substance that (1) members of both the majority 
and minority should reexamine their position, (2) a jury has the right to fail to 
agree, and (3) the burden of providing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains 
with the government.”91 Failure to follow these three requirements, the First 
Circuit found, would require reversal of a defendant’s conviction.92 Further, 
where the jury indicates that it is deadlocked, the judge must tell the jurors that 
they will not be expected to deliberate indefinitely until a unanimous verdict is 
reached.93 This watered-down method seeks to ensure that no undue pressure 
is ever placed on a deadlocked jury. 
The Eighth Circuit has endorsed a similar balanced instruction, urging that 
supplemental charges be given to deadlocked panels with “great care.”94 The 
Eighth Circuit defined five factors that are examined to determine if a charge is 
permissible: “a recognition that a majority of jurors may favor acquittal, that 
the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that both 
the majority and minority should reexamine their views, that the jurors should 
not abandon conscientiously held views, and that the jury was free to deliberate 
as long as necessary.”95 Later, the court created another test for coerciveness 
which examines four factors: “(1) the content of the challenged instruction, (2) 
the length of the period of deliberations following the Allen charge, (3) the total 
 
per se coercive).   
89. See Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961).   
90. 820 F.2d 508, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1987).  The elements of the test were first described in United 
States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971).   
91. United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 222 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 853 (1996).   
92. See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In situations 
where the substance of these elements was not communicated to the jury, the court has found reversible 
error without further inquiry.”).     
93. See Manning, 79 F.3d at 223.  The court of appeals has also held that while giving multiple 
modified Allen charges is not forbidden, the court should strongly avoid doing so.  United States v. 
Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1304 (1st Cir. 1997) (“A successive charge tends to create a greater degree of 
pressure” on jurors).  See also Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (“This charge has been called the dynamite 
charge. Like dynamite, it should be used with great caution, and only when absolutely necessary.”).   
94. United States v. Young, 702 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1983).   
95. United States v. Robinson, 953 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1992).  See also United States v. Webb, 
816 F.2d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987).   
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time of deliberation, and (4) any indicia in the record of coercion or pressure 
upon the jury.”96 Like the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit allows a modified 
Allen charge, but strongly advises its district courts to give supplemental 
instructions as part of the final instructions to the jury and not when the jury 
first becomes deadlocked.97 Further, in examining a charge for coerciveness, 
the Tenth Circuit looks at the language of the instruction, its timing, whether it 
was given with other instructions, and how long the jury deliberated after 
hearing the instruction before rendering a verdict.98 
The Fourth Circuit has also defined numerous factors that are relevant in a 
coercion inquiry, including “the charge in its entirety and in context; 
suggestions or threats that the jury would be kept until unanimity is reached; 
suggestions or commands that the jury must agree; indications that the trial 
court knew the numerical division of the jury; indications that the charge was 
directed at the minority; the length of deliberations following the charge; the 
total length of deliberations; whether the jury requested additional instruction; 
and other indications of coercion.”99 
Other circuits have rejected Allen. Both the Third Circuit and the District 
of Columbia Circuit have banned the Allen charge outright.  In United States v. 
Fioravanti, the Third Circuit called the Allen charge discredited and fraught 
with “treachery,”100 and held that any Allen instructions given to a jury would 
be automatic grounds for reversal.101 It reasoned that the dynamite charge 
violated the jury’s “exclusive providence” of determining guilt or innocence by 
coercing a verdict.102 The court of appeals further held that any supplemental 
charge must be carefully crafted and avoid any language which encourages 
specific jurors to reconsider their views during deliberations.103 In place of the 
Allen charge, the Third Circuit allowed the use of a supplemental instruction 
with innocuous language that merely urged jurors to “consult with each other” 
but never “surrender [their] honest conviction as to the weight . . . of 
evidence.”104 
In United States v. Thomas, the D.C. Circuit replaced the Allen charge, 
 
96. Webb, 816 F.2d at 1266 (quoting United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 1980)).   
97. United States v. Alcorn, 329 F.3d 759, 767 (10th Cir. 2003).   
98. Id. at 765; Gilbert v. Mullin, 302 F.3d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2002).   
99. Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2000).  See also United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 
933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1995).   
100. 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969).     
101. Id. at 420 (“But hereafter this court will not let a verdict stand which may have been 
influenced in any way by an Allen Charge.”).  See also United States v. Burley, 460 F.2d 998, 999 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (holding that a supplemental instruction to deadlocked jury which made mention of the 
expense of a new trial was coercive).  But see United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(court of appeals held trial judge’s reference to the expense of a retrial was improper but not grounds for 
reversal of conviction).   
102. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 417. 
103. Id. at 420.   
 104. Id.
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which had been the standard supplemental instruction in the District, with the 
standards crafted by the ABA105 The new instruction made no mention of 
jurors in the minority or majority and urged jurors to weigh the evidence 
presented at trial, but never surrender their honestly held beliefs.106 Like the 
charge instituted by the Third Circuit, the D.C. Circuit’s instruction retains 
little of the language from the original Allen charge.  It illustrates how over 
time, courts have gone to considerable lengths to sanitize supplemental 
instructions given to hung juries.  As a result, guidelines have been crafted that 
do nothing to help break deadlock in criminal trials, while their many 
exceptions, caveats, restrictions, and requirements only further litter the 
jurisprudence with confusing case law.   
At the other extreme, some circuits continue to use the dynamite charge in 
a form very close to the original approved by the Supreme Court in 1896.  The 
Second Circuit has issued opinions in the last decade reaffirming dedication to 
the original Allen charge.  In United States v. Melendez, the Second Circuit 
held that Allen was still applicable, despite vociferous objections by the 
defendant.107 Recently, the Second Circuit expanded on its reading in 
Melendez, ruling that an Allen charge would only be grounds for reversal where 
it was coercive, with coercion being determined by a “totality of 
circumstances” test.108 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has approved a version very close to the original 
Allen charge for use by its courts.  One approved charge tells a deadlocked jury 
that “[t]he trial has been expensive in time, effort, and money to both the 
defense and the prosecution.”109 It then notes that if the jury cannot come to a 
 
105. 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971).   
106. See United States v. Dorsey, 865 F.2d 1275, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  In Dorsey, the court of 
appeals found that the given supplemental instruction was not coercive, and borrowed from the ABA’s 
own suggested instruction: 
 The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.  In order to return a 
verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto.  Your verdict must be unanimous.   
 It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment.  Each of you 
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the 
evidence with your fellow jurors.  In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to 
reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous.  But do not 
surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the 
opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
 You are not partisans.  You are judges – judges of the facts.  Your sole interest is to 
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.   
Id. at 1276.     
107. 60 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 1995). 
108. United States v. Crispo, 306 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2002).  The Second Circuit’s view is in 
seeming accordance with the Supreme Court’s test established in Jenkins.  See Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446 
(the Court held that trial court actions would be judged in “[their] context and under all the 
circumstances” to determine if coercion was present).   
109. Pattern Jury Instructions of the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 1.45 (2001). 
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verdict, the matter “[would be] left open and must be tr[ied] again.”110 While 
most circuits would surely find this language coercive because it makes jurors 
feel as though they must come to a verdict, the Fifth Circuit has upheld these 
instructions on several occasions.111 In fact, one Fifth Circuit opinion even 
spoke of “Allen’s age-old wisdom.”112
The wildly varying approaches of the federal courts of appeal suggest that 
there is no federal law about how to charge deadlocked juries.  The states are 
equally twisted in their approaches. 
ii. State Courts and Dynamite 
 Like the federal circuits, some states have banned the charge outright, 
others have crafted their own modified charges, and some retain the dynamite 
charge in its nearly original language from 1896.  For the most part, however, 
the states have stopped using Allen for the same reasons many of the federal 
circuits have abandoned it.  There has been a pronounced drive in many states 
to adopt the ABA’s suggested standards for supplemental instructions and 
scrap the old Allen charge.  By one commentator’s count, almost half of the 
states have integrated the ABA standards either partially or completely into 
their own hung jury instructions.113 
The standards suggested by the ABA make several changes to the Allen 
charge.  They advocate a supplemental charge that does not specifically address 
any particular jurors – whether they are in the minority or majority of the 
deadlocked panel – but rather speaks to the panel generally.  They emphasize 
that no juror should abandon his or her “honest conviction[s].”114 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the ABA instruction is to be given not when 
deadlock is first encountered, but instead right before the start of deliberations.  
This last requirement ensures, at least in the ABA’s eyes, that there is no 
coercion by making jury members think that they must come to a verdict.  
 There are a large number of permutations to the charges given to 
deadlocked juries today.  This includes differences not only in the language and 
structure of the charge, but the time that it is given,115 the number of times that 
it can be given,116 whether it can be given if the jury informs the judge of its 
 
110. Id. See also United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1321 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975).   
111. See United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1997); Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d 
876, 883 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 2003).   
112. United States v. Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 1993).  
113. Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in State Criminal Cases 
to Give Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge) – Modern Cases, 97 A.L.R.3d 96, § 5 
(a) (1980).   
114. Id. 
115. See People v. Morrison, 532 N.E.2d 1077, 1090 (Ill.App. 1988).   
116. See Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd., 707 N.E.2d 695, 701-02 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1999) 
(holding that the giving of multiple instructions to the jury was not error per se); United States v. 
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exact numerical breakdown,117 and even if it can be given without counsel 
present at the time.118 These variations are just some of the more prominent 
modifications state courts have made to their deadlock supplemental 
instructions.  It is impossible to precisely catalogue all of them.   
 Alaska has rejected the use of the dynamite charge, replacing it with the 
ABA standards.119 California,120 Colorado,121 Hawaii,122 Illinois,123 
Louisiana,124 New Jersey,125 Ohio,126 and others have banned the Allen charge, 
replacing it with a heavily modified version or a model molded after the ABA’s 
suggested elements.127 Each of these states has abandoned Allen out of concern 
 
Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1299 (2d Cir. 1991).    
117. See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Mere revelation of the 
numerical division of a jury, although to be discouraged, does not compel a mistrial.”); State v. Fowler, 
322 S.E.2d 389, 392-93 (N.C. 1984) (finding that is was not error for the judge to know the numerical 
breakdown of the deadlocked jury); United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 500-02 (2d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Parsons, 993 F.2d 38, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1993).  But see United States v. Samuel Dunkel & 
Co., 173 F.2d 506, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that inquiry into the jury’s division was per se error); 
People v. Talkington, 47 P.2d 368, 372-76 (Cal.App. 3d Dist. 1935) (holding that it is per se error for 
the judge to inquire of the deadlocked jury’s numerical breakdown).  See generally 75B AM. JUR. 2d 
Trial § 1583 (2d ed. 2004). 
118. See United States v. Cowan, 819 F.2d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Neff, 10 F.3d 
1321, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993); State v. Estrada, 738 P.2d 812, 828 (Haw. 1987); United States v. Ronder, 
639 F.2d 931, 934 (2d Cir. 1981).  But see United States v. Hernandez, 146 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 1998). 
119. Fields, 487 P.2d 831.  Alaska formally embraced Allen in Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1005 
(Alaska 1962).  See also 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1589 (2004).   
120. Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1009 (stipulating that the Allen charge “should never again be read in a 
California courtroom.”).   
121. People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Colo. 1984) (court endorses modified supplemental 
charge which urges jurors not to give up honest opinion); People v. Watson, 53 P.3d 707, 713 
(Colo.App. 2001) (modified instruction instructs jurors that (1) they should try to reach a unanimous 
verdict; (2) each juror should consider the evidence impartially and consider it with other panelists; (3) 
should not hesitate to re-examine views if necessary; (4) and should not surrender their honest beliefs 
just to return a verdict).   
122. State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 25 (Haw. 1985) (“We are convinced that the evils far outweigh 
the benefits, and decree that [the use of the Allen instruction] shall no longer be tolerated and approved 
by this court.”).   
123. People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601, 606-10 (Ill. 1972).  See generally 14B Ill. Law & Prac. 
Criminal Law § 770 (2003); 6 Ill. Prac., Criminal Practice and Procedure § 26.93; John F. Decker, Post-
Instruction Issues: Jury Deliberations and Verdict, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 569, 587-95 (2003).   
124. State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639, 641 (La. 1975) (“[W]e henceforth ban the use of the 'Allen 
charge' and of any coercive modification thereof in the courts of Louisiana.”).   
125. State v. Czachor, 413 A.2d 593, 598 (N.J. 1980) (“We come to the conclusion that the Allen 
charge conveys both blunt and subtle pressure upon the jury, pressure which is inconsistent with jury 
freedom and responsibility. Such a charge does not permit jurors to deliberate objectively, freely, and 
with an untrammeled mind. We accordingly hold that such a charge containing coercive features should 
not be given to a jury in the trial of a criminal case.”).   
126. State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d 188, 192-95 (Ohio 1989).   
127. Several states have expressly scrapped the Allen charge.  See Lewis v. State, 424 N.E.2d 107, 
111 (Ind. 1987) (requires that when deadlock is encountered, the judge can order further deliberations, 
but must also reread all of the final instructions to the jury); State v. Flint, 761 P.2d 1158, 1162-65 
(Idaho 1988); State v. White, 285 A.2d 832, 837-38 (Me. 1972) (ABA standards and charge are 
recommended for Maine courts); People v. Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d 441, 450 (Mich. 1974) (any 
supplemental instructions to deadlocked jury must be in accordance with the ABA instruction); State v. 
Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 772 (Minn. 1973) (“We hold now that use of the Allen charge shall be 
discontinued in Minnesota and the procedures set forth in ABA Standards. . . are adopted for the trial 
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that it coerces jurors into reaching a unanimous verdict.  This mass rejection of 
Allen is well illustrated by the courts in California and Michigan.  The 
California Supreme Court scrapped Allen and any variations of it, finding that 
the decision was a relic that inherently coerced jurors.128 Similarly, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that any substantial variation from the ABA 
instruction would be automatic grounds for reversal.129
Other states allow more leeway.  In Alabama, for example, the dynamite 
charge can be used by criminal trial judges so long as the language of the 
instruction is not threatening.130 In Arkansas, judges can administer an Allen 
charge and even make reference to the potential cost of a retrial,131 as well as 
inquire of the foreperson as to the deadlocked jury’s numerical breakdown.132 
Similarly, Connecticut’s version of the Allen charge, the “Chip Smith” charge, 
has been upheld despite its urgings to jurors in the minority to reconsider their 
views.133 Texas has done the same.134 Giving the charge multiple times is 
also fair game in several jurisdictions.135 But these states are in the distinct 
minority in their qualified support of Allen.
Perhaps the only thing that all of the states have in common is that each of 
their instructions includes language which cautions jurors not to acquiesce 
during deliberations.  Finding your way through the modern Allen forest is 
exceedingly difficult.  Nor have the ABA standards helped. When first created, 
these standards were seen as a solution to Allen’s perceived deficiencies.  
However, as we have demonstrated, the ABA standards have only further 
clouded the Allen issue.  Deadlock instructions are still routinely challenged as 
coercive by defendants. These federal and state charges are just the veritable tip 
of the iceberg.  They represent only a tiny portion of the different instructions 
 
courts in this state.”); Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976) (“[t]he ‘Allen Charge’ in any 
of its various forms should not given.”); State v. Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Neb. 1970); Wilkins 
v. State, 609 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Nev. 1980); State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1973); State v. 
Alston, 243 S.E.2d 354, 364-67 (N.C. 1978); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275 A.2d 299, 303-05 (Pa. 
1971); State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 320-23 (R.I. 1973); State v. Ferguson, 175 N.W.2d 57, 59-61 
(S.D. 1970); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975); Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 
1976).  Others states have merely recommended the use of the ABA charge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 200-02 (Mass. 1973); State v. Perry, 306 A.2d 110, 112 (Vt. 1973); Winters 
v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 532-34 (D.C. 1974).   
128. Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1004-05, 1009.   
129. Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 450 (Mich. 1974).  Maryland adopted a similar approach, finding that 
a trial court committed reversible error where it gave a modified version of the Allen charge instead of 
the preferred ABA instruction.  See Burnette v. State, 371 A.2d 663, 666-69 (Md. 1977).   
130. Maxwell v. State, 828 So.2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).   
131. Griffin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ark.App. 1981).  See also Wright v. State, 553 S.E.2d 
787, 789 (Ga. 2001); Freeman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2003).   
132. Davis v. State, 892 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Ark. 1995).   
133. State v. O’Neill, 511 A.2d 321 (Conn. 1986).   
134. See 8 Tex. Prac., Criminal Forms and Trial Manual § 96.31 (10th ed. 2004). 
135. See Jones v. State, 505 S.E.2d 749, 753-54 (Ga. 1998).  But see Washington v. State, 758 
So.2d 1148, 1154 (Fla.App.4.Dist. 2000) (holding that it is per se reversible error to give a supplemental 
instruction twice to a deadlocked jury).   
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state criminal courts use in instructing deadlocked juries today.   
 Confusing?  Undoubtedly.  A Gordian knot?  Considering the law in the 
United States as a whole, it is certainly twisted quite thoroughly.  Of course, in 
any individual jurisdiction, as long as the judge sticks to the charge that the 
highest court has approved, he or she can follow a rule as to the content of the 
charge.  The difficulty is that the state and federal courts have no clear law 
about how many times the charge can be given, whether it may be varied if it is 
given again, and how long a jury may be held before a mistrial is the only, or 
the best, option.  Thus, even trial judges who give the prescribed instruction 
face a Gordian knot if the first charge does not work.  Judges do not like to be 
reversed, of course, and the net effect of the Gordian knot in this context is that 
judges usually don’t give the charge more than once or twice.  The judicial 
reluctance to keep juries deliberating results in more mistrials.  How much do 
these additional mistrials harm the system? 
F. Assessing the Hung Jury Problem 
While there are scant studies on the frequency of hung juries in American 
courts today, the existing data do not reveal a crisis.136 The data do show, 
however, sufficient hung juries in state and federal courts to justify seeking a 
remedy to reduce the number.  Hung jury rates in many states are quite high.  
Moreover, while the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a retrial,137 retrials are 
expensive.  In many jurisdictions, a trial can run close to $10,000 per day, with 
many cases running even higher.138 One must also take into account the 
emotional toll that retrials pose for criminal victims as well as their families.  It 
is therefore not surprising that one study found that only one-third of hung jury 
mistrial cases are retried.139 Thus, relying on a state’s ability to initiate a retrial 
is a poor solution.  A better solution would be to reduce the number of 
mistrials.   
 
136. Nevertheless, in recent years, in the wake of several high-profile mistrials, hung juries have 
received considerable coverage by the news media.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, THE 
NEW YORKER, 55 (Feb. 24 & March 3, 1997) (discusses the trend of black women on juries deadlocking 
criminal trials of young black defendants in the District of Columbia); Joan Biskupic, In Jury Rooms, 
Form of Civil Protest Grows, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at A1; Seth Mydans, The Other Menendez 
Trial, Too, Ends with the Jury Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at A1; Carrie Johnson, Judge 
Declares Mistrial in Tyco Case, WASH. POST., April 3, 2004, at A1.   
137. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), is understood today to stand for the 
proposition that double jeopardy is not violated when a mistrial is granted because of a hung jury.  One 
of us has argued that Justice Story’s opinion in Perez has been misunderstood.  See George C. Thomas 
III, Solving the Double Jeopardy Mistrial Riddle, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551 (1996).  But the 
understanding, or misunderstanding, is settled law today. 
138. Dwayne Bray, Prosecutors Seek a Change in Jury-Voting System, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, 
at B8.  Similarly, in Santa Clara County, it was estimated that trials cost nearly $3,000 per day.  Sandra 
Gonzales, Movement Afoot to Reform Juries, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 8, 1995, at 1A. 
139. PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTING CORPORATION, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
OCCURRENCE CASE EFFECTS AND AMOUNT OF TIME CONSUMED BY HUNG JURIES, 4-30 to 4-37 (1975). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art31
23
The best and most recent study of hung juries was conducted by the 
National Center for State Courts (NCSC).140 The NCSC looked at criminal 
felony trials in all the federal district courts141 from 1980 to 1997, using 
information provided by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.142 The NCSC also examined hung jury rates in the states.  However, 
because of the sheer volume of criminal jury trials that are conducted in the 
states every year, the authors used the thirty most populated counties in the 
U.S. from 1996 to 1998.143 
Overall, the NCSC authors found that between 1996 and 1998, mistrials 
resulting from deadlock in state courts occurred at a rate of 6.2%.144 The  rates 
varied dramatically in some cases.  For example, Los Angeles County had a 
hung jury rate of almost 15%, and New York County had a 9% rate.145 
The NCSC found that federal criminal juries hung at a rate of 
approximately 2.54% between 1980 and 1997.146 The study showed that the 
rates were uniformly low among the twelve federal circuits, with one 
exception: the District of Columbia Circuit.147 Criminal jury trials that ended 
in deadlock in federal courts in the D.C. Circuit occurred at a rate of 9.5%.148 
No other circuit exceeded 3.1% during any one year in that three-year 
period.149 
Is a mistrial rate that ranges from 2.5% to 15% a significant problem?  A 
fifteen percent hung jury rate must be burdensome to the California court 
system. Using the state average, 6.2%, about 3,500 hung jury mistrials occur in 
 
140. In addition to the NCSC study, there have been other notable studies on hung jury rates.  The 
first was THE AMERICAN JURY, written in 1966 by Harry Kalven, Jr. and James Zeisel, which found that 
mistrials resulting from hung juries occurred in approximately 5.5% of all criminal cases in the United 
States.  Id. at 56.  Another, conducted by the Planning and Management Consulting Corporation, studied 
the rate of hung juries in California courts.  It found that between 1971 and 1973, the average rate of 
hung juries in California’s ten biggest counties was over 12%.  PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT STUDY,
supra note 139, at 4-6, 4-30 to 4-37.  On the whole, however, there have been few studies which have 
examined the rate of hung juries in American courtrooms.   
141. As of January 2005, there were 665 federal district judges in the United States.  See 
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/about/frequently.html. 
142. Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, and G. Thomas Munsterman, Are 
Hung Juries a Problem?, (Report of The National Center for State Courts, September 30, 2002).  The 
study is available at: 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf. 
143. Id. at 24.  The authors provide a detailed description of their methodology and how they 
researched these statistics.  For a full list of the counties studied, with their average number of criminal 
jury trials per year and hung jury rates from 1996 to 1998, see id. at 25. 
144. Id. at 20, 25. 
145. Id. at 25 fig. 2.5. 
146. Id at 22-23 fig. 2.3, 2.4.  These statistics are taken straight from a chart of hung jury rates that 
the NCSC authors provide.  We estimated the criminal hung jury rates for each year and averaged them.  
Therefore, there may be a slight variation between the 2.54% described here and the actual percentage.  
However, because the study did not provide the exact percentage, an estimation was required.     
147. See Hannaford-Agor, et al., supra note 142, at 23 fig. 2.4.   
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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a year.  Using the estimate for retrials, about 2,000 state felony trials would end 
without a verdict.  To be candid, if it were difficult to sever the mistrial 
Gordian knot, it might not be worth the candle.  The system can very well 
tolerate 2,000 felony trials that end without a verdict.  But it is so easy to solve 
the problem that courts should cut the hung jury Gordian knot.  We explain 
how in the next part. 
III. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT 
Given the wide disparity in the permitted charges, and the lack of guidance 
on how many times a charge can be given and how long a jury can be kept in 
deliberation, judicial coercion may well lurk in the various charges that have 
grown from the Allen weed.  No modern system would permit the kind of 
coercion practiced in Bushel’s Case. The Supreme Court held that it is 
coercive to tell a jury it has to reach a verdict and that seems right to us.  But 
what if there were a type of charge that was almost entirely cleansed of 
coercion?  In that case, we believe, judges could be trusted to give it as many 
times as seemed helpful. 
 Is there a largely coercion-free charge?  We believe the answer is yes and 
that it is an obvious solution.  It first seemed odd that no one had thought of 
this obvious solution, but the reason is, once again, the Gordian knot.  If a 
legislature took a look at the problem, our solution would quickly occur to 
someone involved in finding a solution.  But as the courts labored in the 
common law vineyard, they wore blinders that kept them from thinking of a 
new solution.  They took the old cases and pruned and shaped but they didn’t 
think to start over.   
 One can start over by returning to Justice Story’s opinion in Perez. Recall 
his description of what a trial judge should do when faced with a deadlocked 
jury: a hung jury mistrial “ought to be used with the greatest caution, under 
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital 
cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with 
any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.”150 How can judges be 
both “extremely careful how they interfere” and at the same time grant 
mistrials only “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious 
causes”?  The answer, we believe, is to ask the jury to keep trying, not to give 
up, to keep talking. 
 We have named the suggested procedure the “Keep Talking Charge.” It 
would accomplish three key objectives.  First, it would do more to break 
deadlocks than the Allen charge.  Rather than torture jury panels with long-
 
150. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.    
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winded instructions,151 the “Keep Talking Charge” would be clearer.  Second, 
the new procedure would cut through the Gordian knot of confusing Allen law, 
thereby helping appeals courts save time and resources.  Third, the new charge 
would not be plagued by accusations that it coerces jurors.  If implemented 
correctly, the Keep Talking Charge is no more than an invitation to continue 
deliberation.  By eliminating court inefficiency and coercion, the Keep Talking 
Charge would improve criminal justice administration.   
Trial courts today have discretion to send deadlocked juries back for further 
deliberations without any instructions.  We believe courts would be much wiser 
if the judge discharged this discretion by issuing a Keep Talking Charge that 
asks the jury simply to “please continue your deliberations.”  A handful of state 
and federal courts have spoken to this very issue, albeit briefly and somewhat 
indirectly.  In Alabama, for example, the state’s highest criminal court has held 
that merely instructing a jury to continue deliberations was not coercive where 
the jury reported itself deadlocked.152 Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
ruled that “[m]erely advising a deadlocked jury to continue deliberations does 
not, standing alone, constitute coercion or improper conduct on the part of the 
trial court.”153 The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that a judge’s 
statement to the deadlocked jury to “continue your deliberations” was not 
coercive,154 and the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that asking a hung jury to 
continue deliberating was by its very nature not coercive.155 Other state courts 
have followed suit, upholding the trial judge’s ability to order further 
deliberations without any accompanying supplemental instructions.156 
There is some case law on point in the federal courts as well.  Of all the 
federal courts of appeals, the Seventh Circuit has spoken most directly to the 
permissibility of merely ordering further deliberations.  In United States v. 
Degraffenried,157 the court examined a trial court’s instruction that was 
challenged as coercive.  When the jury reported itself deadlocked, the judge 
told the panel “[m]embers of the jury, I’ve read your note.  Please continue 
 
151. See infra note 173.   
152. George v. State, 717 So.2d 849, 852 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997).  See also Showers v. State, 407 
So.2d 169, 171 (Ala. 1981) (“It is quite clear that under Alabama law a trial judge may urge a jury to 
resume deliberations and cultivate a spirit of harmony so as to reach a verdict, as long as the court does 
not suggest which way the verdict should be returned and no duress or coercion is used.”).    
153. State v. Webb, 793 P.2d 105, 115 (Ariz.App. 1990).  The court expanded on this holding in 
another decision, finding that sending a jury back twice for further deliberations without instruction was 
not coercive either. State v. Campbell, 706 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz.App. 1985).  See also State v. Long, 
294 S.E.2d 4, 11 (N.C.App. 1982). 
154. People v. Farley, 712 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Colo.App. 1985). 
155. People v. France, 461 N.W.2d 621, 632-33 (Mich. 1990).   
156. See, e.g., Cavendish v. State, 496 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Ind. 1986); State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 
911-12 (Minn. 1996); McKnight v. State, 738 So.2d 312, 321 (Miss.App. 1999); State v. Leroy, 724 
S.W.2d 277, 279 (Mo.App. E.D. 1987); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.31 §§ 7-8 (Vernon 2004).  
157. 339 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003).   
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deliberations.”158 The court found that the response carried “no plausible 
potential for coercing the jury to surrender their honest opinions . . .”159 
The ABA agrees that a court “may require the jury to continue their 
deliberations” where it is unable to agree.160 Further, in its published Standard 
Jury Instructions,161 the ABA notes that ordering further deliberations is 
acceptable so long as “the court does not threaten to require the jury to 
deliberate an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable periods.” 162 
To be sure, an occasional court163 or commentator164 has argued that merely 
requesting further deliberations can be coercive.  But these puzzling objections 
fail to take note of the historic, thousand-year-old duty of juries to reach a 
verdict.  All that is generally required is that the judge believe that there is still 
a reasonable probability of the jury reaching a unanimous verdict.165 As long 
as a reasonable probability exists, the Keep Talking Charge cannot, in our 
view, be viewed as coercive.   
The question that then remains is how many times a judge can order further 
deliberations in a given trial?  Once is obviously fine, but what about two 
times, three times, or more?  This of course cannot be answered in the 
abstract.166 The judge should naturally consider the complexity of the issues 
presented in the case and the time the jury has spent deliberating prior to 
declaring itself hung.  But we think it unwise to cap the number of times the 
judge can ask the jury to continue deliberations.  Obviously, if a judge sends a 
jury back for further deliberations a dozen times, the likelihood of reversal is 
vastly increased.  However, it is a matter that should be generally left to the 
 
158. Id. at 580.    
159. Id. at 580-81 (quoting United States v. D’Antonio, 801 F.2d 979, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1986)).  See 
also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 489 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The relevant inquiry . . . is whether 
the court’s communications pressured the jury to surrender their honest opinions for the mere purpose of 
returning a verdict.”) (quoting United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1985)).   
160. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO JURY TRIALS STANDARD 15-4.4(b).  
The commentary to this standard further holds that “a court may send the jury back for additional 
deliberations even though the jury has indicated once, twice, or several times that it cannot agree or even 
after jurors have requested that they be discharged.”  See also Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 768-70, 772; State 
v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1994).  It is important to note that the ABA of course 
distinguishes between ordering further instructions and giving a hung jury an Allen charge.   
161. ABA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 5.4(b).   
162. People v. Cook, 342 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Mich.App. 1983).   
163. Goodwin v. State, 717 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla.App. 2d Dist. 1998).   
164. Note, supra note 66, at 393 n.37 (“The jurors naturally look to the court for approval and 
encouragement.  Sending a jury back for additional deliberation in silence could be interpreted as an act 
of impatience of disapproval, and might intimidate a juror as effectively as would an urgent order from 
the court to come to immediate agreement.”). 
165. See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 686 (Cal. 1992); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 402 (2d 
ed. 2004).   
166. See People v. Andrews, 486 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (3d Dept. 1985) (“[w]here a trial court is faced 
with a deadlocked jury, there is no precise formula to determine exactly how many times to send the 
jury back or how long the jury should deliberate.”).   
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judge’s discretion.167 To fully appreciate the breadth of the trial judge’s 
discretion, one need look no further than to the wise words of Justice Story in 
United States v. Perez:
We think . . . the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a 
jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the 
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the 
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.  They are to exercise a sound 
discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which 
would render it proper to interfere.168 
Following Justice Story, if a jury tells the judge that it is hopelessly deadlocked 
after an hour of deliberations, or if the case is particularly complex, the judge 
should be free to ask the deadlocked panel more than once to continue 
deliberating.169 
We wish to be clear that the use of the Keep Talking Charge would not 
preclude other supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury. Often, juries 
send notes to the judge during deliberations, asking questions regarding the 
evidence, the appropriate law, and other matters.  A trial court should respond 
to specific jury questions as it sees fit and the law dictates.  But this is another 
realm of law entirely, and is therefore separate from the considerations raised 
by Allen, its many variations, or the Keep Talking Charge.  
We came across only three studies which suggest the same approach to the 
instruction problem as this article constructs, and all of them reject the idea on 
grounds that sending the jury back for more deliberation is futile because 
deadlocked juries need instruction from the trial judge.170 This argument 
conflates specific jury questions about the law, which the judge should answer 
as noted above, with the problem that the jury is deadlocked because its 
members disagree about whether the accused did what he is charged with 
doing.  No instruction on the law is going to move jurors who simply disagree 
about whether the accused committed the crime.  Therefore, where a jury 
announces itself deadlocked and “groping”171 with the questions of factual 
guilt, the court should just leave it to continue its debate in hopes of ultimately 
 
167. See generally H.H. Hansen & D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Time Jury May Be Kept Together on 
Disagreement in Criminal Case, 93 A.L.R.2d 627, §§ 4-6, 8 (1964); 75B AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 
1648 (2004).   
168. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.   
169. Indeed, the time necessary to show coercion varies between jurisdictions.  See State v. 
Burroughs, 556 S.E.2d 339, 344 (N.C.App. 2001); Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42, 45 (Miss. 1988); State 
v. Keeler, 316 A.2d 782, 783 (Conn. 1972); Commonwealth v. Bregnard, 334 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Mass. 
App. 1975); Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Influences on the Jury, 91 GEO. L.J. 
513, 527 n.1675 (2003) (reviews case law as to this issue).   
170. See Marcus, supra note 66, at 638; Comment, Criminal Procedure – Jury Instructions – ABA 
Standard Adopted for Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 42 TENN. L. REV. 803, 814 (1975); Note, 
Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite, supra note 66, at 393 n.37.   
171. Prim, 289 N.E.2d at 608 (“a jury should not be left to grope in such circumstances without 
guidance from the court.”).  See supra note 66 (nearly every article argues that Allen is coercive and 
endorses using the ABA standards).   
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coming to a unanimous verdict without resorting to a long-winded instruction.   
We believe that the Keep Talking Charge would also be more effective in 
breaking jury deadlock.  Admittedly, there is no empirical evidence to prove 
this contention.172 But even a cursory glance at the original Allen charge 
reveals its complex and confusing nature.  It encourages jurors to debate and 
discuss, and never give up their honestly held views, but not much else.  At the 
risk of boring the reader to death, we reprint a typical modern Allen charge: 
 I am going to instruct you to go back and resume your deliberations. I will explain 
why and give you further instructions. 
 In trials absolute certainty can be neither expected nor attained. You should 
consider that you are selected in the same manner and from the same source as any 
future jury would be selected. There is no reason to suppose that this case would 
ever be submitted to 12 men and women more intelligent, more impartial or more 
competent to decide it than you, or that more or clearer evidence would be 
produced in the future. Thus, it is your duty to decide the case, if you can 
conscientiously do so without violence to your individual judgment. 
 The verdict to which a juror agrees must, of course, be his or her own verdict, the 
result of his or her own convictions, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion 
of his or her fellow jurors. Yet, in order to bring 12 minds to a unanimous result, 
you must examine the questions submitted to you with an open mind and with 
proper regard for, and deference to, the opinion of the other jurors.  
 In conferring together you ought to pay proper respect to each other's opinions 
and you ought to listen with a mind open to being convinced by each other's 
arguments. Thus, where there is disagreement, jurors favoring acquittal should 
consider whether a doubt in their own mind is a reasonable one when it makes no 
impression upon the minds of the other equally honest and intelligent jurors who 
have heard the same evidence with the same degree of attention and with the same 
desire to arrive at the truth under the sanction of the same oath. 
 On the other hand, jurors favoring conviction ought seriously to ask themselves 
whether they should not distrust the weight or sufficiency of evidence which fails to 
dispel reasonable doubt in the minds of the other jurors. 
 Not only should jurors in the minority re-examine their positions, but jurors in the 
majority should do so also, to see whether they have given careful consideration 
and sufficient weight to the evidence that has favorably impressed the persons in 
disagreement with them. 
 Burden of proof is a legal tool for helping you decide. The law imposes upon the 
prosecution a high burden of proof. The prosecution has the burden to establish, 
with respect to each count, each essential element of the offense, and to establish 
that essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. And if with respect to any 
element of any count you are left in reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to 
the benefit of such doubt and must be acquitted.  
 It is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so without 
violence to your individual judgment. It is also your duty to return a verdict on any 
counts as to which all of you agree, even if you cannot agree on all counts. But if 
you cannot agree, it is your right to fail to agree. 
 I now instruct you to go back and resume your deliberations.173 
172. However, the effectiveness of the Allen charge itself has been a subject of some examination.  
One study that examined Allen’s effectiveness found that Allen is useful in creating jury unanimity, but 
that it is coercive.  Saul M. Kassin, Vicki L. Smith, and William F. Tulloch, The Dynamite Charge: 
Effects on the Perceptions and Deliberation Behavior of Mock Jurors, 14 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
537, 540-41, 547-49 (1990).  See also Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit 
of Justice, 51 OHIO. ST. L.J. 687, 704-07 (1990); Mark M. Lanier & Cloud Miller, III, The Allen 
Charge: Expedient Justice or Coercion?, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. ___ (2001) (argues that Allen is 
generally effective in helping break hung juries).  
173. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d at 194.  See also Seawell, 550 F.2d at 1161 n.2 (court approved 
supplemental charge of 974 words).  See generally 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, et al., FED. JURY PRAC.
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This modified supplemental charge is longer and more confusing than the 
original Allen charge.  It is almost living proof of the overgrowth of law that 
Justice Jackson highlighted in Douglas and that we have analyzed in this 
article.  Rather than confuse and bore jurors, how much simpler simply to ask 
them to keep deliberating.  That, they will understand.  A deadlocked jury that 
is sent back once, twice, perhaps three times or more would have an incentive 
to reach a unanimous verdict.174 Thus, a Keep Talking Charge would likely be 
more effective than Allen, as well as less coercive. 
The power to issue Keep Talking Charges has existed at least since 1824.  
It did not flourish as did the Allen charge, perhaps because it seems too simple.  
Once the Allen idea was firmly planted in the common law soil, it was almost 
inevitable that it would become a Gordian knot.  With so many variables, and 
so little guidance from the Supreme Court, the strong likelihood was that the 
law would develop in unplanned and idiosyncratic ways.  It has.  It is time for 
courts, or the legislatures, to cut the Gordian knot.  Trial judges should be told 
to ask juries to continue deliberating even when they think they are strongly 
deadlocked.  It is a good idea.  It is implicit in Justice Story’s Perez opinion.  It 
is time to bring back the wisdom of 1824. 
CONCLUSION 
For half a century, Allen v. United States has been a lightning rod for 
criticism.  Implementation of the Keep Talking Charge would erase all of the 
objections that plague Allen. The Keep Talking Charge is the best solution to 
the hung jury Gordian knot because it allows judges to press the jury to 
continue deliberating without saying anything that might push the jurors 
towards a verdict one way or the other.  The Keep Talking Charge would make 
the Allen charge unnecessary, thus eliminating virtually all arguments that 
judges coerced verdicts out of deadlocked juries.175 The Keep Talking Charge 
recognizes the broad power of trial judges to control jury deliberations. It is not 
a dramatic change in the law but a return to simpler days of Justice Story.  
Even if the Keep Talking Charge does nothing to depress the rate of 
mistrials, it is a vast improvement over the Gordian knot of current law.  Nearly 
 
AND INSTR. CRIM. § 20.08 (5th ed. 2000).    
174. Of course, there are those who think the Allen charge is very effective at breaking deadlocks, 
including prosecutors.  See Mark Hansen, All About Allen: Judges’ Charge to Deadlocked Juries Comes 
Under Scrutiny, 87-JUN ABA J. 24 (2001).  
175. This is an argument that should not be underestimated. Defendants will often challenge any 
tendered Allen charge on coercion grounds in hopes of winning an appeal.  The defendant’s challenge in 
United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1970) demonstrates this point.  While the 
Fourth Circuit rejected each of the defendant’s contentions, the defendant’s arguments are illustrative of 
how any Allen charge can be challenged as coercive, regardless of its language, structure or timing.  See 
also Leslie Shea Riggsbee, United States v. Burgos: Balanced Blasting for Deadlocked Juries, 74 N.C. 
L. REV. 2036, 2041-44 (1996).   
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every state and federal circuit has its own Allen procedure, with no two being 
identical.  The lack of uniformity combined with the widespread resistance to 
Allen from many in the legal community illustrates that the current procedures 
are not working.  Allen creates more harm than good today.  The knot should 
be cut. 
It seems likely that, beyond cutting the knot, the Keep Talking Charge can 
save a few thousand mistrials a year, and reduce the flood of appeals based on 
coercive Allen charge claims.  This would be an unalloyed good for the twenty-
first century criminal justice world.   
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